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Abstract
This paper studies inference in a continuous time game where an agent's decision to quit an activity depends on
the participation of other players. In equilibrium, similar actions can be explained not only by direct inuences but
also by correlated factors. Our model can be seen as a simultaneous duration model with multiple decision makers
and interdependent durations. We study the problem of determining the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
stopping strategies in this setting. This paper provides results and conditions for the detection of these endogenous
eects. First, we show that the presence of such eects is a necessary and sucient condition for simultaneous
exits. This allows us to set up a nonparametric test for the presence of such inuences which is robust to multiple
equilibria. Second, we provide conditions under which parameters in the game are identied. Finally, we apply the
model to data on desertion in the Union Army during the American Civil War and nd evidence of endogenous
inuences.
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11. Introduction
In this paper we set up a continuous time model to describe a multi-person decision problem of
timing coordination. Individual strategies are exit (or entry) times to a certain activity such as
when to join a social welfare program, desert from an army or emigrate to a dierent region. After
characterizing the equilibrium for such a situation, we assess the empirical implications of the
model in the presence of direct strategic eects of a player's action on other agents' choices. The
main nding is that such endogenous eects are necessary and sucient for simultaneous exits
with positive probability in the proposed environment. This has consequences for the statistical
treatment of such settings and for inference. We also show that in this model the number of play-
ers impacts observed (equilibrium) outcomes only in the presence of endogenous eects. We then
devise a test for the existence of endogenous eects taking into account the fact that time is not
observed continuously but at discrete intervals. The paper subsequently analyzes circumstances
under which parameters of interest are identied. Finally, we illustrate the application of these
tools with an analysis of desertion in the Union Army during the American Civil War.
It is dicult to explain why agents behave similarly when they do so. Individuals may
act similarly in response to correlated shocks or genuinely in reaction to each other's actions |
a legitimate endogenous eect.1 We analyze a situation in which agents take a binary action and
choose the timing for such an action. Crucially, correlated behavior may arise through correlated
eects or through a direct impact on others.
One reason to properly account for endogenous eects is that they might have dierent
implications for policy than correlated eects. Endogenous eects may create \social multipliers"
and blow up the eect of other factors determining behavior.2 This may signicantly alter the
choice of treatments in policy-relevant situations like crime reduction, welfare program partici-
pation or immigration. Imagine, for instance, a situation in which agents choose when to join a
certain welfare program. A person's timing may be determined by common factors or directly
by the timing of other agents' decisions (or both). If the participation of one's reference group
| the endogenous eect | is a suciently strong determinant for an agent's choice, one could
concentrate eorts on a subgroup of the community and hope to aect the remaining members
as the focus group joins the targeted activity. If on the other hand the main driver is common
shocks that provoke participation, a policy-maker may prefer to identify and directly act on such
dening variables.
1Manski (1993) provided a clear categorization for the possible causes of similarities in behavior and coined
the expression \reection problem" to characterize the diculties in separating endogenous and other social and
correlated eects.
2For a recent exposition on this issue, see Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002).
2Manski (1993) notes that the identication of endogenous social eects in a static context is
dicult. Nevertheless, the introduction of dynamics allows for identication if group actions inu-
ence individuals with a lag. In this paper, even though the distinction between contemporaneous
and adjacent periods in a continuous time environment becomes negligible as the two coalesce,
the endogenous eects can still be identied since the relevant payo variables are assumed to
evolve smoothly (according to a diusion process). Hence this article identies a particular class
of environments for which the identication question can be solved. The adequacy of our as-
sumptions will depend on the particular empirical application at hand. In particular, the diusive
behavior of state variables is an important consideration. Examples of empirical analyses (with a
focus on individual decision making) where state variables are traditionally modeled via diusion
processes can be found, for instance, in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and include applications such
as investment in oshore oil reserves and participation in securities markets. Building intuition
for continuous time settings as limits of discrete time environments, Merton (1990) (Chapter 2)
provides conditions under which per period discrete time innovations produce continuous sample
paths in continuous time.3 In fact, traditional discrete time dynamic discrete choice models with
normal preference shocks would in the limit (as frequency increases) produce diusive utility pro-
cesses (e.g., the works surveyed in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)). Consequently, at high enough
frequency those models are well approximated by continuous time models where the state variable
of interest | the utility process | evolves continuously and the adequacy of the discrete time
analog would imply the appropriateness of our model. It is important to bear in mind though that
our methodology provides no \silver bullet" and its suitability should be determined in accordance
with the application.
In a timing framework, statistical inference typically involves survival analysis or duration
models. Whereas standard statistical duration models could be employed to identify the existence
of hazard dependence among agents (as indeed is done in Costa and Kahn (2003) and Sirakaya
(2001) and suggested in Brock and Durlauf (2001)), it is still unclear whether such eects are
primarily due to endogenous inuences or to correlated unobservables. In contrast, our model
clearly separates both channels and lays out the circumstances under which each of these sources
is individually identiable. Another issue that arises in the particular setting we study | timing
problems | is that endogenous eects generate simultaneous actions with positive probability in
continuous time. This is an outcome that does not occur in standard duration models. Failure to
properly account for such phenomena may bias estimation and misguide inference.4
3In Merton's characterization, continuous sample paths arise even when certain types of \rare events" are
allowed.
4See, for instance, van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Ridder (1994).
3Applications for the above tools comprise all those circumstances that focus on timing
coordination and would involve \duration"-type models with multiple agents. One may cite, for
instance, participation in a social welfare program, stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and
Stein (2004)), migration (Orrenius (1999)) and even crime recidivism (see, for instance, the em-
pirical investigation by Sirakaya (2001), where social interactions are found to meaningfully aect
recidivism among individuals on probation).
This paper contributes to the econometric literature on social interactions. At the same
time, it borrows standard tools used in the nance and investment literatures. We review the
relevant literature in the following subsection.
1.1. Literature Review
In this paper we provide a model for timing coordination. Early references to such situations can
be found for instance in Schelling (1960), which discusses the timing of mob formation. Our paper
also relates to the threshold models of collective behavior in Granovetter (1978), for which \the
costs and benets to the actor of making one or the other choice depend in part on how many oth-
ers make which choice." Although that paper focuses on the binary nature of the actions taken, a
timing element exists in many of the examples gathered (diusion of innovations, strikes, leaving
social occasions, migration and riot formation). We formalize these ideas using tools of continuous
time probability models in which individuals choose an optimal timing strategy to quit (or join)
a certain activity. Our theoretical model is also connected to the one developed in Mamer (1987)
for a discrete time setting and in a dierent framework.5 As a result, our model is in the family
of stochastic dierential games | continuous time situations in which the history is summarized
by a certain state-variable. This literature is more concerned with zero-sum games, whereas we
focus on situations involving coordination elements. Our theoretical model can also be related to
the continuous time game presented in Hopenhayn and Squintani (2004). In their case the payo
ows evolve discontinuously, whereas in our case the utility ow is continuous with probability
one. This distinction diminishes the role of beliefs with respect to the opponent players in our
case and turns out to be an important simplifying element in our analysis. As is outlined later in
the paper, the continuity of payo ows is also a crucial identifying assumption once we focus on
the empirical content of the model.
In simple contexts it is usually dicult to separate endogenous eects from other social
forces (Manski (1993)). This diculty explains our search for structure in the context under
analysis. We consider a continuous time model in which utility evolves smoothly. The continuous
5In his paper this author is mostly concerned with research and development investment applications in which
rms have complementary decisions.
4time assumption will be appropriate in circumstances where agents (are allowed to) revise their
decisions frequently and observations (by the econometrician) are not coarse. The continuity of
sample paths imposes structure on the stochastic shocks in the environment. As stressed earlier,
both requirements may or may not be empirically valid approximations. When applicable, they
allow us to identify endogenous eects from other correlated eects. Strategic interactions also
pose an additional problem that may hinder identication and estimation: that of multiple equi-
libria.
We use the tools of continuous time optimal stopping problems that appear in the invest-
ment and nance literatures (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Whereas studies in this literature do
address the interaction of many agents, what distinguishes our model is a clear separation between
endogenous and correlated eects.
Our paper is also related to the empirical literature on \duration-type" situations with many
interacting agents. One example is Sirakaya (2001), in which the author investigates duration de-
pendence in the timing of crime recidivism. Brock and Durlauf (2001) cite other applications, such
as the timing of out-of-wedlock births or rst sexual experience. Still, the studies indicated there
do not look at the endogenous eect but focus instead on contextual neighborhood variables. In
their analysis of group homogeneity and desertion, Costa and Kahn (2003) discuss the possibility
of a contagion eect and try to account for it by introducing the fraction of deserters in a military
company as a regressor (p. 538). Although this is indicative of endogenous interactions, without a
structural representation it is still not clear whether this is due to endogenous or correlated eects.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present the general model
and establish the existence of equilibrium. Section 3 discusses and characterizes a particular speci-
cation for the model and sets the scene for Section 4, in which we discuss the empirical implications
of the model. In Section 5 we illustrate the previous discussion with a dataset comprising Union
Army recruits during the American Civil War. We obtain evidence that there were endogenous
eects involved in the decision to desert the army and estimate the model by simulation methods.
The nal section concludes.
2. The Model
As a mathematical model of the world, consider a probability space (
;F;P) in which a given
state ! 2 
 is chosen according to a probability law P. There are I agents who take part in a
certain activity (we will loosely use I to denote the set of agents and its cardinality). A gain
function (ui : R  [0;T] ! R) captures the utility an individual derives as he or she exits the
activity. If an agent i 2 I leaves at a time i 2 [0;T](T 2 R++, where R++ = (0;1]), he or
5she collects a reward of ui(xi
i;i) where xi
t is an individual-specic state variable (e.g., wealth,
utility-relevant inputs) and xi
i is this variable evaluated at the chosen i. The stopping strategies
are represented by i : 
 ! [0;T], a (possibly innite) stopping time with respect to an individual
ltration Fi = (Fi
t)t2[0;T]
6 representing agent i's ow of information. Although this information
ow arises endogenously in the game, we assume throughout that the individual ltration satises
the usual conditions.7 We allow the individual information histories to dier across individuals.
These individual information sequences will be the basis for an agent's strategy, since the ltration
Fi = (Fi
t)t2[0;T] incorporates the assumptions imposed on what each agent knows or not as time
evolves. Later on we assume that each agent observes his or her own state variable xi
t and whether
or not other agents in the game have stopped (but not their individual state variables).
We assume that the individual state variable evolves as a process (adapted to the Fi =
(Fi
t)t2[0;T] ltration) that may depend directly on the participation of the remaining individuals
in the group. This direct inuence represents the endogenous eects in our model. Let i
t be the




1) (with IfAg as the indicator function for the event A  
). This process will be determined
endogenously as individuals choose the stopping times. Throughout we assume that i
t 2 Fi
t: one
knows how many players have stopped up to (but excluding) the current instant. Each individual
state variable xi
t is assumed Markovian and is allowed to dier across individuals. The structure
for the multi-person problem (payos, players, strategy spaces and information assumptions) is as
follows.
Denition 1 (Synchronization Game) A Synchronization Game is dened as a tuple hI;(
;F;F;P;
(ui)i2I;(xi)i2I;(Ti)i2Ii where I is the set of agents; (
;F;F;P), a ltered probability space; ui :
R  R+ ! R, an individual gain (utility) function; xi, an individual adapted process having as
state space R+; and Ti, a set of stopping strategies  : 
 ! [0;T].
Each person i faces the following (individual) optimal stopping problem (where  generically
















6A random variable  : 
 ! [0;T] is a stopping time with respect to (Ft)t2[0;T] if, for each t 2 [0;T], f! :
(!)  tg 2 Ft. Intuitively they represent stopping strategies that rely solely on past information.
7The ltration is right-continuous and F0 contains all P-negligible sets in F.
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(!)) with initial condition given by





















t is a Wiener process and the drift and dispersion coecients are positive Borel-measurable
functions. The initial distribution F i
0 is furthermore independent of the Brownian motion W i
t.
There are no restrictions on the contemporaneous correlation between the Wiener processes, which
account for the correlated eects.
Notice that the state variable has continuous sample paths (P-a.s.). This allows us to treat
individual beliefs about the position of a counterpart's state variable conveniently (in contrast,
for instance, to the work by Hopenhayn and Squintani (2004), where sample paths present dis-
continuities). Since the stochastic utility processes evolve continuously, the probability that a
given individual reaches a stopping region between t and t +  conditional on not having stopped
before t vanishes as  ! 0. Consequently, where a counterpart's state variable is located becomes
immaterial to the decisions taken within the next innitesimal period. When empirically suitable,
the model leads to the identication of endogenous eects that may otherwise be dicult to pin
down (see the discussion in Manski (1993), for example). This is important because the eect of
alternative counterfactual interventions such as those briey alluded to in the introduction may
be signicantly aected by the presence or absence of endogenous eects.
The following conditions ensure that, given a prole of stopping times for each player, this
stochastic dierential equation has a (strong) solution:
Assumption 1 (Lipschitz and Growth Conditions) The coecients

















s=1;s6=i Ifs<tg=(I 1) is adapted since  is the aggregation of indicator functions
of events such as f < tg, where  is an optional time with respect to the individual ltration.
Given the Borel-measurability conditions on the drift and dispersion coecients, this guarantees
that, for xed x, (t;!) 7! i(x;i
t(!);t) and i(x;i
t(!);t) are adapted. The above assumptions
guarantee the existence of a strong solution for the stochastic dierential equation (2). A sketch
for the proof is presented in the Appendix.
72.1. Existence of Equilibrium
The solution concept we seek for this group situation is that of mutual best responses: a standard
Nash Equilibrium point. The equilibrium strategies are then a vector of I stopping times such that
each individual stopping time is optimal given the stopping rules adopted by the other agents.8
Denoting by  = (i)i2I a stopping time prole, let Ui() = Exi[ui(xi;i)] subject to the above
transition laws and initial conditions and evaluated at the strategy prole . We also adopt the
convention of using  i as shorthand notation for (s)s2I fig. To proceed with the analysis of
equilibrium, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 (Exponential Discounting) Let ui(x;t) = e itgi(x);i > 0;gi : R+ ! R;8i 2
I. We refer to gi() as the reward function.
Assumption 3 (Reward Function) The individual reward functions gi();8i 2 I are such that:
(Monotonicity) gi() is increasing; (Convexity) gi() is convex; E[supt2[0;T] je itgi(xi
t)j] < 1;
(Twice Dierentiability) gi() is twice dierentiable; and (Bounded Derivative) the derivative g0()
is bounded.
Assumption 4 (Bound on Volatility) For each t < 1 and feasible prole of stopping strate-







Assumption 5 (Complementarity) The drift and the dispersion coecients are assumed to be
decreasing on their second argument: @(;;)  0 and @(;;)  0.
The Exponential Discounting Assumption (2) simplies the manipulation and is standard. The
set of assumptions regarding the reward functions, (3), encompasses monotonicity and convexity,
which are not very controversial either (convexity is not necessary if  does not depend on , for
instance); a boundedness condition, employed to assert the existence of a solution for the optimal
stopping problem, and technical assumptions that facilitate the application of existing results in the
comparison of solutions for stochastic dierential equations. The Bound on Volatility Assumption
(4) implies that changes in the prole of stopping decisions aect the objective function only
through the drift of the discounted gain function. Finally, the Complementarity Assumption
8Since the strategies depend on information generated by the state variables and these are Markovian and since
optimization follows Bellman's principle of optimality in dynamic programming | whatever the initial state and
decisions are, the remaining decisions must be optimal with regard to the state resulting from the rst decision |
these are also Markov perfect equilibria.
8(5) expresses the idea that higher participation makes the activity more attractive as well as
increases the volatility of the returns. This assumption means that one agent's action is a strategic
complement to the others' actions. We are now ready to state the following result (the proof is
available upon request; all the other proofs are given in the appendix):9
Theorem 1 (Existence) Under Assumptions 1-5, the Synchronization Game has a nonempty
set of equilibrium points and this set possesses a maximal element.
Under such general conditions, little can be said regarding uniqueness and other properties.
In the next section we make further assumptions on the structure of the game.
3. A Coordination Game
We now specialize the model to extend the analysis. Consider initially a game where agents
contemplate the possibility of exit. As before, a state variable x represents the latent utility a
player collects when abandoning a certain activity. At exit, he or she pays a cost C. The strategy
is then a rule dictating his or her exit decision using the available information at the time. Given
a discount rate , the objective for the agent is to maximize Ex[e t(xt   C)].
At an initial stage consider the individual problem where the state variable x follows:
dxt =
(
xtdt + xtdWt if t  
(   )xtdt + xtdWt if t > 
where   0 and  is an exogenously given random time. We assume that the individual observes
Wt and whether or not the random time occurred up to (but excluding) time t: Ft = (xs;I<s;s 
t). The initial condition is drawn from an independent distribution F0 as in equation (2). The
break point for the drift here is exogenously given. At a later stage we will endogenize this stopping
time to make it dependent on the decision by the other participants. For there to be a well-dened
solution to this problem, we assume that  > . If  is too low, a patient agent will postpone the
switching decision indenitely and stopping times may not be nite (see, for instance, Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), p. 138).
Let x be the process corresponding to (!) = 1;8! 2 
 (i.e. a geometric Brownian
motion with coecients x and x) and x be the process corresponding to (!) = 0;8! 2 

(i.e. a geometric Brownian motion with coecients (   )x and x). We can use dynamic
programming to show that the optimal stopping times for these two processes depend on z =
9Mamer (1987) obtains the existence of equilibria in a similar (but more restrictive) game in discrete time
through similar techniques.











+ 2=2 > 1
(see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 140-144). The agent will stop the process as soon as it hits z.
For convenience, we omit the parameter dependence of z in the remainder of the section.
Given a random time , we propose the stopping rule characterized by the following con-
tinuation region:
fx  z  z(;;C;;;t;other parameters)g if t  
fx  zg if t > 
(6)
where the threshold levels z are determined from value matching and smooth pasting considerations
in the optimal stopping problem (see the proof for Proposition 1). The \other parameters" refer
to parameters related to the hazard rate associated with  (as perceived by the agent). If  arrives
at a constant hazard rate , for instance, the threshold is constant in time and depends on the
arrival rate  and the decay in the drift . Once  arrives, the process starts afresh and one is
better by adopting the lower threshold rule. This rule is easily extended to processes with multiple
breaks at increasing stopping times. It delivers a stopping strategy by which the agent switches
progressively to lower threshold levels as the drift breaks take place. We thus state the result for
the more general case:
Proposition 1 Assume that  >  and let logxt = t   
Pn
k=1(t   k)Itk   2
2 t + Wt
where   0;; > 0;t 2 R+;n 2 N;W is a standard Brownian motion and fkgk=1;:::;n is an
increasing sequence of stopping times. The optimal continuation region for the stopping problem
is given by
fx  zk 1g if t  k;k = 1;:::;n
fx  zng if t > n
for some threshold levels zk  zk(t) with zk(t) > zk+1(t); 8t k 2 f1;:::;n   1g and zn  z.
Consider now a game with two agents indexed by i = 1;2. They contemplate an exit decision that
will cost them Ci;i = 1;2. In return, they collect a value xi;i = 1;2 but now the latent utility
process for one agent is negatively aected once the other agent decides to leave the activity. In
10analogy to the previous individual setup, the information structure for the game assumes that each
player observes his or her own state variable process and whether or not the other agents stopped













t if t > j
where i;j = 1;2, i 6= j and j is the stopping time adopted by the other agent in the game
and, as above,  > i. The contemporaneous correlation between the Brownian motions is left
unconstrained and i measures the external eect of the other agent's decision on i. As pointed
out previously, this reveals the two major aspects of group behavior under consideration in this
study: correlated and endogenous social eects. Individuals might behave similarly in response




t are correlated. This represents the correlated eects. On the other hand, agents
may be directly aected by other agents' actions as well. This would appear as a decrease in the
protability prospects an agent derives by remaining in the game. This is the endogenous eect.
Our parameterization assumes that individual switching costs are constant. This is in line
with standard models in the investment literature. Another plausible conguration would allow
this cost to depend on the number of individuals in the group I. If exit costs Ci are modeled as
continuously evolving state variables (see, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p. 207) whose
drifts are aected by the number of agents who choose to exit, the model is basically akin to
the one presented here and x could actually be interpreted as the evolution of a utility process
net of exit costs.10 Our results would be essentially unchanged but with x reinterpreted in this
way. Insofar as agents care about net utility for decision making, not the utility and exit costs
separately, the detection of endogenous eects would not be aected. The implication of multiplier
eects for the take-up of social programs such as those discussed in the Introduction would still
occur.
The previous analysis establishes that each agent will use the \high drift" optimal stopping
rule characterized by the (moving) threshold zi  zi(t) while j  t. As soon as j < t, she
switches to the \low drift" stopping rule characterized by the threshold zi. In this case though,
we need to handle the fact that j is not exogenously given but determined within the game. It
is illustrative to portray this interaction graphically.
Figure 1 displays the X1X2 space where the evolution of the vector-valued process (x1;x2)
10Allowing costs to jump with the number of individuals who exit would introduce discontinuities in the state
process and raise concerns previously alluded to.
11is represented. Since i > 0;i = 1;2, we should have zi(t) > zi;i = 1;2. Agents start out under
threshold zi(t). If the other agent stops, the threshold level drops to zi. In Figure 1, for instance,
the process uctuates in the rectangle (0;z1)  (0;z2) and reaches the barrier z1 causing agent 1
to stop. Once this happens, agent 2's threshold drops to z2, which, once reached, provokes agent
2 to stop.
FIGURE 1 HERE
A more interesting situation is depicted in Figure 2. Here, the vector process sample path
attains the upper threshold for agent 1 at x2  z2. The second agent's threshold moves down
immediately and both stop simultaneously. So, if an agent's latent utility process is above the
subsequently lower threshold when the other one drops out, there will be clustering and they
move out concomitantly. This is an interesting feature of the game that is not present in standard
statistical models that would handle timing situations such as this: the positive probability for
simultaneous events even when time is observed continuously. If not properly accounted for, this
can bias results toward erroneous conclusions. 11
FIGURE 2 HERE
One concern in the analysis of this interaction is how beliefs about the state of one's op-
ponent should aect his or her actions. If an individual knows only whether or not the opponent
has quit, how should he or she take into consideration the risk of being preempted? Should the
player take the presence of the opponent for granted and delay the decision to quit or must he
believe that the other agent is about to quit the game and hence leave the activity immediately?
Such considerations point to the importance of beliefs in these environments and are a relevant
consideration in Hopenhayn and Squintani (2004), for instance. In the present case, such calcula-
tions are of lesser importance since the state variables evolve continuously. This implies that the
likelihood that an agent reaches a stopping region between now (t) and an  unit of time in the
future (t + ) vanishes as  ! 0. Consequently, the beliefs about the location of the opponents'
state variables are of second order to the decisions taken within the next innitesimal period by a
given agent.
The intuition above carries over with more than two agents. Assume as before that an exit














t; i 2 I
11Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994), for instance, point to a negative duration dependence bias in
estimates if simultaneity is left unaccounted for.
12where j is the stopping time adopted by the agent j. The external eect of other agents on i is
i > 0 and is considered to be homogeneous across agents, i.e. the amount by which the drift
i decreases with each stopping decision is the same regardless of who deserts.
A few other denitions are convenient:
zi
m : z(i;i;Ci;i;m;i;t) where i;m 2 I
Sm : f(x1;x2;:::;xI) 2 RI
+ : 9i such that xi  zi
mg where m 2 I
0 : 0 (meaning 0(!) = 0;8!)
A0 : II (identity matrix of order I)
m : infft > m 1 : Am 1xt 2 Am 1SI+1 10Am 11g where Am 1SI+1 10Am 11
denotes the set formed by operating the matrix Am 1 on each





m if k = l = i and am
kl = 0 otherwise and m 2 I
The stopping times dened above are essentially hitting times. The thresholds zi
m are dened by
the value matching and smooth t conditions (see the proof of Proposition 2 for details).
The game starts out with no defection and agents hold the highest barrier zi
1(t) as the initial
exit rule. The rst exit occurs at 1, the hitting time for the stopping region S1. As the process
reaches this set, one or more agents quit. This also shifts the thresholds down as the stopping
region moves to S2. To track the players who drop out at 1 we use the matrix A1, a diagonal
matrix with ones for those agents who did not drop out at 1 and zeros, otherwise. Analogously for
further stopping rounds, defections occur at the stopping times  and 10A1 records the number
of agents that have not stopped after that stage. This goes on until all agents have stopped. The
following proposition summarizes our result:
Proposition 2 The prole (














This proposition states that the hitting times constructed previously may be used to rep-
resent an equilibrium for this game. For the reasons discussed in the next subsection, this is the
equilibrium we focus on in this paper.
3.1. On Multiple Equilibria and Equilibrium Selection
The above equilibrium is the only equilibrium that is robust to positive delays in information
about the exit of others. As we drive this delay to zero, this is as if each agent observed his or her
13own state variable process and whether other agents stopped up until but excluding the current
instant t: stopping decisions are observed with an \innitesimal" delay.
Most of the equilibria considered in the previous discussion rely on a strong degree of
synchronization among agents. If nevertheless one agent's exit is perceived with a delay, dropping
out may not elicit other players' exit. The protability of remaining in the game, represented by
the drift coecient, would be unchanged. Then, exit would only be optimal on the equilibrium
portrayed in the previous subsection. This \synchronization risk" is inherent in many similar
situations (see Abreu and Brunnermeier (1997), Brunnermeier and Morgan (2004) and Morris
(1995)) and equilibria that survive such synchronization issues are naturally more compelling. To
formalize this intuition, consider the case of two players (I = 2) and a vector-valued random













t if t > 
where i;j = 1;2, i 6= j and  = j + i is the stopping time adopted by the other agent in the
game with an i delay and, as before,  > i. The following statement then holds:
Proposition 3 Assume that P(fi > 0g) = 1;i = 1;2 and P(f1 = 2g) = 0. Also, let
S(t) = f(x
1;x
2) : 9i such that x
i  z
i(t)g
and S = infft > 0 : (x1
t;x2
t) 2 S(t)g denote the hitting time for this set. The stopping strategies








S6=zi; i = 1;2:
As i
P  ! 0, the above strategies converge to the strategy depicted in Proposition 2. For this
reason, we restrict our attention to the unique equilibrium that is robust to such perturbations
and corresponds to the one displayed in the last subsection.
Other information structures would nonetheless be susceptible to multiple equilibria,12
though the occurrence of joint exit with positive probability is robust to the existence of multiple
equilibria and the issue of equilibrium selection. Given this, some of our results in this and the
subsequent section are robust even to the existence of multiple equilibria. Next we discuss the
empirical implications of the model.
12A discussion of this can be found in a longer version of the paper available on the author's website.
144. Empirical Implications
In this section we investigate the empirical implications of the model. The unit of observation is a
game13 and N such units are recorded in a sample. We restrict attention to the unique equilibrium
depicted in the previous section, which is robust to perturbations in the timing at which agents
become aware of the actions of other players.
Our analysis of the model has so far allowed for asymmetry in individual parameters so
that for instance  and  may be indexed by individual, i. To discuss its empirical relevance, we
impose additional assumptions, and we consider a symmetric version of the game where ;;C
and  are homogeneous across players and  may dier insofar as it depends on individual specic


















0; i 2 I
where j is the stopping time adopted by player j. The cross-variation process for the Brownian
motions is given by hW i;W jit = t;i 6= j and the initial condition x0 = (xi
0)i2I follows a probability
law F i
0. It is assumed throughout that jj < 1.
The individual initial drift coecient is potentially a function of an l-dimensional vector
of individual covariates wi(1l), which is independent of the Brownian motion. More specically,
i = (wi). To benet readability, we suppress the argument and denote the drift by i. Let Fw
denote the distribution of w = (wi)i2I. In what follows all of the statements are conditional on
w = (wi)i2I. The parameter  measures the external eect of the other agents decisions on i
and introduces endogenous social eects. The coecient  represents correlated social eects. In
addition to the above parameters, each agent pays a cost C to leave and discounts the future at
the exponential rate . Finally, zi;i 2 I denotes the threshold presented in the previous section.
4.1. Characterization
The next proposition states that (under continuous time observability) simultaneous departures
occur only in the presence of endogenous eects.15
Proposition 4 P[i = j;i 6= j;i;j 2 I] > 0 if and only if there are endogenous eects ( > 0).
13In our empirical application a game is a military company. In other applications, it would be a household or a
geographic market or some other arena of interaction for the agents under analysis.
14This does not necessarily mean that the asymmetric game is not identied. If the parameters depend on i, we
conjecture that the model is not identied unless one can for example sample the same players repeatedly.
15This proposition does not depend on the fact that i = ;8i. It nonetheless relies on the assumption that
i > 0;8i.
15Intuitively, because of the diusive nature of the utility process correlated disturbances oc-
cur in a much smoother manner if compared to the impact of an agent's exit, which is immediately
assimilated via a decrease in the growth rate of x and a revision of the stopping rule. This is a
useful feature of this model and holds in many empirical situations in which the model applies.
Moreover, this empirical implication does not rely on the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Notice
that in traditional econometric models for duration analysis the probability of simultaneous exit
is zero and such incompatibility may provoke biased estimates and contaminate conclusions.
This result relies on the continuity of the sample paths for the stipulated process. If discon-
tinuities are allowed, this may not hold any longer.16 The problem would nonetheless be lessened
if one knew the timing of such shocks since clustering in other moments is then seen as evidence
in favor of endogenous eects.
Another implication is that the number of players should aect equilibrium stopping out-
comes only in the presence of endogenous eects. This is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 If the number of players I aects the marginal distribution of equilibrium stopping
times in the game, then there are endogenous eects ( > 0).
Notice that the direction in which the equilibrium stopping times are aected is not clear.
On the one hand, more players will cause each one's exit to have a smaller impact on an agent's
latent utility process; on the other hand, exits will tend to occur earlier. Also, as mentioned
earlier, if costs are also allowed to depend on group size, the proposition above should be framed
in terms of utility processes net of costs.
4.2. Nonparametric Test for Endogenous Interactions
If time were recorded continuously, Proposition 4 would suggest that observing simultaneous exits
would be enough to detect endogenous eects. When time is marked at discrete intervals, though,
exit times would be lumped together regardless of the existence of endogenous inuences. In this
subsection we explore the possibility of testing for the existence of social interactions, taking into
consideration that time is not sampled continuously.
Let n = 1;:::;N index independent realizations of the game and denote by In the number
of players in realization n. Time is observed at discrete intervals of stepsize N. Given a dis-
cretization ft0;t1;:::g such that ti+1   ti = N;8i, we denote the probability of a simultaneous
exit by any pair of players
PN(f simultaneous exit g) = p(N)
16One way to introduce such discontinuities is to insert an exogenous jump component dQi in equation (2). In
this case, beliefs would play a more signicant role.
16and allow the discretization to depend on the sample size.
Imagine that there are no endogenous interactions. In this case, for a small enough dis-
cretization, doubling the observation interval would roughly double the probability of recording
exits as simultaneous. If these endogenous eects are present, since even at continuous time sam-
pling there would still be clustering, doubling the discretization does not increase the probability
of joint exit by as much. In the limit, if all exits are indeed simultaneous in continuous time,
varying the grid of observation would have no eect on the probability of observing simultaneous
dropouts. We use this intuition to develop a test for the null hypothesis of no endogenous eect
through variation in the interval of observation.
In our model, when there are no endogenous eects, the function p() is dierentiable with














where n is the set of all player pairs in game n and i
N is the exit time observed when the
discretization grid size is N. If the game has only two players, yn;N records whether there was
simultaneous exit under a discretization of size N. It can be established that E(yn;N) = p(N).
For In = 2, var(yn;N) = p(N)(1 p(N)). For the general case, we denote var(yn;N) = v(N).
It is easily seen that p(0) > 0 ) v(0) > 0 and p(0) = 0 ) v(0) = 0. Given the observation of N
i.i.d. copies of such games, consider yN;N = N 1 PN
n=1 yn;N. Then:
Theorem 2 Assume
1. p() is dierentiable and p0
+(0) > 0 if p(0) = 0;
2. N;i = aiN ;i = 1;2;3 with a1 < a2;a3(a2 6= a3), and 1=3 <  < 1;
3. The games observed are i.i.d..


























































whereas if there are endogenous eects (p(0) > 0), the statistic in (7) is not bounded in probability.
Above, p0
+() denotes the right-derivative of function p(). The smaller and the closer N;1
and N;2 are, the higher the precision for the ratio is.17 Also, in estimating the asymptotic
variance, one could use as consistent estimators the sample counterparts:
\ p(N;j) = yN;j j = 1;2
and the sample variance covariance matrix across the games.
The above result allows us to test the null hypothesis that there are no endogenous eects
(H0 : p(0) = 0) and no clustering results in continuous time when observations are recorded
discretely with the suggested statistic. As a corollary for the theorem, the test will be consistent.
Its performance may nevertheless be aected (especially in small samples) by other parameters
such as the correlation coecient .
Since it relies on Proposition 4, the above result is also robust to the existence of multiple
equilibria (as long as the equilibrium played is the same across the games sampled). In the next
subsections we explore some representation and identiability properties under the assumption
that the equilibrium played is the one characterized in the previous section.
4.3. Identification
One question that arises naturally is the possibility of disentangling correlated and endogenous
eects in the data. The econometrician observes the equilibrium exit strategies (1;:::;I) for a
certain number of realizations of the game. Let  denote some outcome variables observed by the
researcher and w, some observable covariates. A parameter   (of arbitrary nite dimension) lies
in a certain set 	 and governs the probability distribution P(jw; ) of the outcome variables.
The following denes identication.
Denition 2 (Identication) The parameter   2 	 is identied relative to ^   if ( ^   = 2 	) or
(P(jw; ) = P(jw; ^  );Fw-a.e. )   = ^  ).
17As it relies on Assumption 2, the power of the test may be aected by the coarseness of the data in a non-
negligible manner. This is an issue as well for related techniques in continuous time nance and in the empirical
game estimation literature. Our empirical application employs data at a daily frequency, which is appropriate for
the phenomenon investigated.
18The rst stand on identiability for the model above is a negative one: the full parameter
vector is not identied. To see this, notice that with no social interactions or correlated eects
( = 0 and  = 0), the individual Brownian motions are independent and each agent's latent
utility process evolves as a geometric Brownian motion with drift i, diusion coecient  and
initial position xi. As a consequence, the exit times 
i are independent (possibly defective) inverse
Gaussian random variables (see Chhikara and Folks (1989)). This distribution is characterized by
two parameters for which the mean and harmonic mean are maximum likelihood estimators and
minimal sucient statistics. Since we would still have more than two parameters (;;C;), the
model remains unidentied.
Under certain circumstances, though, some positive assertions about the parametric iden-
tication for this model can be made even when ; 6= 0. Identiability may be achieved if one
is able to introduce \enough variability" through the use of covariates. Recall that we assumed
i = (wi), where wi is a set of covariates. These covariates may encompass individual-specic
characteristics, such as income or assets, as well as publicly known information, which would
be a common covariate to all agents, or observable group characteristics (which would account
for contextual eects in Manski's categorization). Let g(t; ;w) denote the probability density
function for the rst desertion time under the parameters   = (;;;;;C) and conditioned
on the observable covariates w. The following statement establishes sucient conditions for the
identication of  . It basically states that relative identication is achieved if, by perturbing the
covariates, one perturbs the Kullback-Leibler information criterion.18
Theorem 3 Let wi contain at least one continuous random covariate, () be C1 with respect to





g(t; ^  ;w)
i
g(t; ;w)dt 6= 0 (8)
then   is identied relative to ^  .
To check condition (8) one should obtain the density g(). To illustrate the above theorem,












18Another potential avenue for identication would be through the results presented in McManus (1992). With a
suciently high number of players (corresponding to endogenous variables) relative to the parameters of the model,
the structure can be seen to be (generically) identied.
19As pointed out in the preceding discussion, this will be the probability density function for stopping
times in our model when there are no social eects and hence  =  = 0. In this scenario,
v = (wi)=   =2 and a = log(z=x0)=, with z as in equation (5). For two sets of parameters




























The derivative of this expression with respect to wi can be obtained and evaluated for dierent
pairs of parameters in order to verify the sucient condition in the theorem. For example, if
(wi) = 0 and ^ (wi) = ^ wi(^  6= 0), after some algebra we obtain that this derivative is:
^ wi



















where ^  is the expression in (3) (using as parameters ^ wi; ^ ; ^ ) and we highlight the fact that ^ ; ^ v
and ^ a all depend on wi. For a given set of parameters the above can be evaluated. For instance,
if C = ^ C = 0:1, x0 = ^ x0 = 1,  = ^  = 0:05,  = ^  = 0:1 and wi = 1, the expression is greater
than 25. As previously noted, ^  = 0:04 and  = 0. These two parameter vectors are relatively
identied provided the support of wi includes 1. It should then be noted that given two parameter
vectors the above expression (or a similar one for  6= 0) will be solved only for certain values
of wi and provided its support is rich enough, a nonzero value for this derivative can easily be
obtained for a large set of wi values and one can use this to ascertain more encompassing global
identication results.
In general, one possible route to obtain g() is to use the close association between the theory
of stochastic processes and the study of dierential equations. Assuming that the equilibrium
played is the one selected in the previous section, the equilibrium strategies can then be expressed
as hitting times to certain sets and it is possible to characterize the survivor function for the rst
hitting time G() through the associated partial dierential equations (and g() =  dG()=dt).
When  = 0 (but  is left unrestricted) and there are only two players, G() is (see Theorem
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with zi  z(i;;C;) and where Iv is the modied Bessel function. Iyengar (1985), which also
derives an expression for the above function, hints that the above is generalizable for higher di-
mensions in our specic situation. The density and the Kullback-Leibler criterion can be obtained
from the above expression for the evaluation of the condition in the theorem for dierent parameter
values.19
5. Empirical Illustration: Desertion in the Union Army
Using a dataset comprising detailed individual records for soldiers of the Union Army in the
American Civil War, we now intend to illustrate the previous discussion on stopping decisions
and timing coordination. Desertion is the event we are interested in. Historians estimate that
desertion aicted a bit less than 10% of the Union troops (circa 200,000 soldiers).
Whereas one could think of the decision to desert as an isolated one, historical studies and
anecdotal evidence support the existence of endogenous eects. Evidence of simultaneous desertion
(on both sides) is pervasive in Lonn (1928): \Usually the recorded statements of specic instances
of desertion whether from Union or Confederate reports, show the slipping-away of individuals or
of small groups, varying from ve to sixteen or twenty." (pp. 152-3) The author goes on to point
out instances where Union soldiers would desert by the hundreds at the same time.
From these facts, it is valid to infer that a soldier's decision to desert probably had a
19 In a proposition available upon request we present the partial dierential equation associated with the survivor
function for more general cases. We conjecture that, even in the presence of discontinuities in the state processes,
a similar result may be attained relying on partial dierential equations for the characterization of equilibrium exit
distributions.
21direct impact on the behavior of others in his company. If no one deserts, the social sanctions
attached to exit tend to be high; if there is mass exit, such sanctions tend to be minimized and
the eectiveness of the military company, tends to decrease. Furthermore, such decisions entailed
costs | the probability of being caught and facing a military court.20 These two aspects are
in accordance with the model we investigated previously. Another feature of these data that is
particularly helpful is the fact that recruits tended to be with a company from its inception and
hence there was very little ow of soldiers into or out of the unit.
5.1. Data and Preliminary Analysis
The data used consist of 35,567 recruits in the Union Army during the American Civil War. This
dataset was collected by the Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago un-
der the auspices of the National Institute of Health (P01 AG10120). It is publicly available at
http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu. The men are distributed across 303 military companies from all
states in the Union with the exception of Rhode Island. These companies were randomly drawn
using a one-stage cluster sampling procedure, and all recruits for each selected company, except
for commissioned ocers, black recruits, and some other branches of military service, were entered
into the sample. These soldiers represent 1:27% of the total military contingent in the Union and
a signicant portion of the 1,696 infantry regiments in that army. According to the Center for
Population Economics they seem to be representative of the contemporary white male population
who served in the Union Army.
A number of variables is available for each recruit. These include dates of enlistment,
muster-in, and discharge as well as information on promotion, AWOL (absent without leave),
desertion, and furlough.21 More detailed military information from the recruit records is available
and is complemented by background information and post-war history originally from the census.
We focus on the main military variables.
According to Lonn (1928), desertion was markedly higher among foreigners, substitutes and
\bounty-jumpers." Substitutes and \bounty-jumpers" appeared as the government started induc-
20Even though the Military Code in eect at the beginning of the war mandated sanctions as harsh as the death
penalty, such punishments required the approval of the President or (later during the war) the commanding general.
According to Costa and Kahn (2003), out of an estimated 200,000 deserters, 80,000 were caught, of which only 147
were executed. Especially in the early years, punishments were notoriously mild, consisting of dismissal with loss
of pay and, toward the end, imprisonment for the duration of the war.
21Desertion and other military events were recorded by the company ocers. Some mis-measurement of desertion
is to be expected, and we ignore this possibility. Records are nonetheless reported to have become more accurate
toward the end of the war, especially after the institution of the oce of provost marshall general in September
1862 (see Lonn (1928)).
22ing enlistment through enrollment bounties | which created the gure of the \bounty-jumper",
who would enlist, collect the reward and desert just to repeat the scheme in another state or
county | and the possibility for draftees to hire substitutes. In the data it is possible to iden-
tify foreigners and substitutes. To assess the eect of \bounty-jumpers" on desertion, we try the
bounty amount paid to each recruit as a proxy variable.22 Other variables are also included, such
as marital status, age and height as well as dummy variables for state and year of enlistment. The
ideal dataset would contain continuous time records for desertion. Here, an event is marked with
daily precision23 and time to desertion is measured from the earliest muster-in date for recruits in
a given company.24
One of the implications of our model is that company size will aect the equilibrium exit
strategies only in the presence of endogenous eects (see the discussion of Proposition 5 nonethe-
less). Table 1 presents evidence for this. The regressions investigate the eect of certain variables
on the mean (log of the) time to desertion at the individual level.25 Company size is a signicant
and robust determinant for the timing of desertion. In addition, we tried other specications with
dierent combinations of independent variables. The company size variable remains signicant
in all of those. Anecdotal evidence and history texts point to a very unsystematic enlistment
process, typically held at the local level by community leaders, which provides some justication
for assuming that the eect of company size does not represent an omitted factor other than the
numbers in the group.
TABLE 1 HERE
To further investigate the presence of endogenous eects in our data, we compute the
statistics in Theorem 2 for various discretization levels. Even though the proposed test could
suer from the arbitrary choice of these parameters, all of them yield results that reject the null
hypothesis of no endogenous eects, as displayed in Table 2 below. The results are for desertions
that did not occur during battles, lest these represent common shocks that discontinuously aect
the utility ow. The conclusions are unchanged if one includes desertions that occurred during
battles.
22The bounty amount was not adjusted for ination, but whenever it was used year dummies were also present
which would capture nationwide ination levels.
23Some deserters did not have precise dates and were thus discarded.
24Non-parametric estimation of the hazard rate suggests negative duration dependence at earlier dates and mildly
positive to no duration dependence later in the soldier's army life.
25The regressions can be related to an accelerated failure time model for the time to desertion. Similar versions
were also run at the company level with essentially the same conclusions.
23TABLE 2 HERE
In the next subsection we proceed with the analysis by structurally estimating the model
considered in the paper.
5.2. Estimation
In this subsection we use a simulated minimum distance estimator for the relevant parameters in
the model proposed in Section 3. We normalize the discount rate ( = 5% per year),26 the exit
cost (C = 1) and the initial condition (x0 = 0:1). The normalizations are necessary as we do
not use covariates in this exercise and identication would be jeopardized without any restriction.
The four parameters estimated are , ,  and . Intuitively the rst three are pinned down
by the distribution of rst exit, which is essentially the minimum of correlated Inverse Gaussian
random variables. In the case of two players, this distribution is given by (??) which is a nonlinear
function of these three parameters. The parameter  on the other hand controls the probability
of simultaneous exits and can be solved for once the other parameters are obtained. Our estimator
^   then minimizes the following distance:









where m : R+  ! Rk and the second sum is taken over the simulated observations generated under
parameter  . The stopping times recorded are only those prior to a certain horizon T, which in
the context stands for the individual term of service in the army. We use R = 1. To simulate the
phenomenon, we have to discretize the sample paths in the simulations. The discretization error in
the simulations can be ignored in large samples for our estimation as long as the discretization grids
are o(
p
N), which we guarantee via an Euler scheme (see Glasserman (2004)). Consistency and
asymptotic normality are then a straightforward application of the results in Pakes and Pollard
(1989). One important condition for this application is that  > 0. We assume that to be
reasonable, given the test statistics obtained in Table 2.
An important simplication is that we assume the thresholds to be constant: zk = z(  
(k 1)=(I  1);;;C).27 The moments matched were mean, harmonic mean, average number
of desertions in each desertion episode and percentage of soldiers leaving before two years.28 In the
26For comparison, commercial paper rates in United States during the war uctuated between 4% and 8% (NBER
Macrohistory Database).
27Similar approximations can be found on the treatment of nite horizon options and seem to work satisfactorily.
Examples are Huang, Subrahmanyam, and Yu (1996) and Ju (1998).
28Very similar results were obtained if one of the percentages was substituted for the average number of deserters
at each desertion episode.
24absence of endogenous or correlated eects, the mean and harmonic mean are MLE and sucient
statistics for the inverse Gaussian distribution. The other two moments are used as  and 
aect the clustering and speed at which individuals drop out in the group. The following table
displays the results and normalizations used in the estimation:
TABLE 3 HERE
The parameters are precisely estimated. The results indicate a substantial endogenous eect.
Using as parameters for this distribution the point estimates above, one obtains a probability of
13:90% for leaving the game before 150 days in the absence of endogenous eects ( = 0). If
on the other hand one-fourth of the company deserts immediately after the beginning of the war
for instance, the endogenous eect coecient estimate implies a probability of leaving the army
before 150 days of 31.78%.29
6. Conclusion
The problem studied here is of great importance in many settings. Decisions about participation
in a social welfare program, bank runs, migration, marriage and divorce are only a few of the
possibilities. Disentangling endogenous and correlated eects is thus fundamental not only to illu-
minate economic research but also to enlighten policy. The setup delineated in this paper allows
us to better understand the nature of endogenous and correlated eects. Whereas this problem is
unfeasible in simpler settings (see Manski (1993)), the separation is not clear in other approaches
that deal with similar situations (as in Brock and Durlauf (2001)).
For the environment considered in this paper, we have learned that endogenous interactions
may be an important component in multi-person timing situations. They can generate simultane-
ous actions with positive probability and thus interfere with the usual statistical inference through
standard duration models. A few characterizations were possible, and a test for the presence of
endogenous inuences was delivered. Finally, structural estimation points to a signicant eect
on the outcome of our particular example.
29We have also estimated the model imposing termination exogenously through death. The results are not much
dierent.
25Appendix: Proofs
Sketch of Proof for the Existence of a Strong Solution
The proof that there exists a strong solution for equation 2 follows from a slight modication of
the proof provided in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), p. 289. The key is to note that the itera-
tive construction of a solution follows through if we replace b(s;x) and (s;x) by b(s;x;!) and
(s;x;!) in the denition of X(k). If, for xed x, (s;!) 7! b(s;x;!) and (s;!) 7! (s;x;!) are
adapted processes, the resulting process is still adapted. The remainder of the proof is identical.
(See also Port and Stone (1991), Theorem V.7)
Proof of Proposition 1
Let the breaks in the drift arrive randomly at the stopping times k with corresponding arrival
rates k(t;!). In other words, let k 2 f0;1;:::;ng describe the regime in which the drift coecient
is    k and the hazard rate at t for moving from state k to state k + 1 is given by k(t;!).
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x   C;(1 + dt) 1fk(t)dtE[J(x + dx;k + 1;t)jx] +
(1   k(t)dt)E[J(x + dx;k;t)jx]g
o
; k  n   1
and J(x;n;t) = J(x), which is the value function for the optimal stopping problem when the
log-linear diusion has the lowest drift. In the continuation region, the second argument in the
right-hand expression is the largest of the two and it can be seen that the value function satises:
( + k(t))J(x;k;t)  AkJ(x;k;t) + Jt(x;k;t) + k(t)J(x;k + 1;t):
where Ak is the innitesimal generator for a log-linear diusion with drift coecient    k.
The left-hand side indicates the loss from waiting one innitesimal instant, whereas the right-hand
side stands for the benet of waiting one innitesimal instant | the expected appreciation in the
value function. This expression holds in the continuation region and the typical
J(zk(t);k;t) = zk(t)   C; 8t (value matching)
Jx(zk(t);k;t) = 1; 8t (smooth t)
26implicitly dene the thresholds zk.
More rigorously,30 let J : R++  f1;:::;ng  R+ ! R be twice dierentiable on its rst
argument with an absolutely continuous rst derivative such that:
1. J(x;k;t)  x   C;
2.  J(x;k;t) + AkJ(x;k;t) + Jt(x;k;t) + k(t)(J(x;k + 1;t)   J(x;k;t))  0, with equality
if J(x;k;t) > x   C;




Let Sk = f(x;t) : J(x;k;t)  x   Cg be the stopping region when the regime is k and consider




 (x   C)jxt = x;kt = k]
and  attains the supremum.
To see this, consider a stopping time  and let m =  ^ m. Then (2), (3) and Dynkin's
formula (Rogers and Williams (1994), pp. 252-4) deliver that
J(x;k;t)  E[e
 mJ(xm;km;m)jxt = x;kt = k]:
Using (1):
J(x;k;t)  E[e
 m(xm   C)jxt = x;kt = k]:
By Fatou's Lemma, liminfm E[e m(xm   C)jxt = x;kt = k]  E[e (x   C)jxt = x;kt = k]
and we have that
J(x;k;t)  E[e
 (x   C)jxt = x;kt = k]:
for an arbitrary stopping time . Using (2) and (3) plus Dynkin's formula one can then obtain
that  attains the supremum. The value matching and smooth pasting conditions are then
consequences of J being C1. As explained earlier, these two conditions implicitly dene the
thresholds zk(t).
That zk(t) > zk+1(t);8t can be seen in the following manner. Let xt(x;k) be the process
initialized at the level x and regime k. Since the drifts in successive states are strictly smaller, a
comparison result such as the one in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), Proposition V.2.18, or Port and
Stone (1991), Theorem V.54, can be established to show that:
e
 t(xt(x;k)   C) > e
 t(xt(x;k + 1)   C); 8t P-a.s.
30The reasoning is in the spirit of similar arguments in Kobila (1993) and Scheinkman and Zariphopoulou (2001).
27This should be enough to imply that the maximum attainable value is decreasing in k:
J(x;k;t) > J(x;k + 1;t); 8t:
Consequently,
J(zk(t);k;t) > J(zk(t);k + 1;t); 8t:
So, stopping at regime k implies stopping at regime k + 1, whereas the opposite does not hold.
This suces to argue that
zk(t) > zk+1(t); 8t k 2 f1;:::;n   1g: 
Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: (Optimal policy characterization) As in Proposition 1, the value function characterizes
the thresholds. Notice, though, that at any instant t the probability that another individual's
latent utility process hits the stopping region in the next innitesimal instant, given that it has not
occurred so far, is negligible, since this process is a diusion. As time goes by, though, the likelihood
that such an event occurs increases toward one and the value of staying should decrease accordingly.
So, we require the function in the limit to agree with the value function in the next regime, which




be the value function for individual i 2 I. Following the steps in Proposition 1, one can see that
1. Ji(x;k;t)  x   Ci;
2.  Ji(x;k;t) + Ai
kJi(x;k;t) + Ji
t(x;k;t)  0, with equality if Ji(x;k;t) > x   Ci;
3. limt!1 Ji(x;k;t) = J
i(x).
where J
i(x) is the value function for the optimal stopping problem with the lowest drift log-linear
diusion.




m(t)   Ci; 8t (value matching)
Ji
x(zi
m(t);m;t) = 1; 8t (smooth t)
As before zi
m(t) > zi
m+1(t); 8t m 2 f1;:::;n   1g.
Step 2: (Stopping times are an increasing sequence) Notice that, by denition, 0  1    I
and consequently form an increasing sequence of stopping times.
Step 3: (At each stage at least one agent stops) 8k 2 I;9j : 
j = k. Take a stopping time k.





1. The vector process Ak 1xt hits Ak 1SI+1 10Ak 11 where (9i 2 I : xi  zi
k and 8j 6=
i;xj < z
j
k+1). In this case, 
i (!) = k(!) (provided i hasn't stopped yet), 8! 2 
1.
2. 
2. The above does not happen. In this case, 9j : z
j
k+1  xj
k (provided j hasn't stopped




k+1 and this implies
that 
j (!) = k+1(!) = k(!);8! 2 
2.
This means that, at each stopping time k, the drift of xi drops by i=(I   1).
Step 4: (
i is optimal) Apply Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: (The strategy prole is an equilibrium) Set  = 
j in Proposition 2. Consider i = infft :








S = zi(t) ) i = S
When the vector process hits S on the subset where xi = zi(t), the hitting times for the vector pro-
cess to reach S and for the component process to hit zi(t) coincide. Since 
j  S by construction,
we should also conclude that:
fx
i
S = zi(t)g  fi  

j g
Agent i should then use i (which coincides with S on this set).
On the other hand,
x
i




S > zj ) 
j = S)
) i > 

j
So, we are in the complementary set, in which it is sensible to use infft > 
j : xi
t > zig = infft >
S : xi
t > zig.
Step 2: (The equilibrium is unique) To see that this is the unique equilibrium, notice that
1. This is the unique equilibrium in which x1

1^
2 = z1(t) or x2

1^
2 = z2(t). In other words, any
equilibrium prole of stopping strategies will have at least one stopper in the rst round of
exits at his or her threshold;
2. If there is another equilibrium, it should then involve rst stoppers quitting at points lower
than their initial thresholds. If only one agent drops, this can be shown to be suboptimal
according to the reasoning of Proposition 2. If both stop at the same time and since P(f1 =
2g) = 0, there is an incentive for one of the agents to deviate and wait. 
29Proof of Proposition 4
Let S = f(x;t) 2 RI
++  R+ : 9i such that xi  zi
1 = z(i;i;Ci;i;i;t)g and S = infft >
0 : xt 2 Sg. Since the sample paths are continuous P-almost surely, by Theorem 2.6.5 in Port
and Stone (1978) the distribution of (xS;S) will be concentrated on @S. Also, it is true that
P(S < 1) > 0.
(Suciency) If there are endogenous eects, zi
1(t) > zi
2(t);8t i 2 I. There will be simulta-
neous exit whenever zi
1  xi
S  zi
2; for some i 2 I. This has positive probability as long as
zi
1(S) > zi
2(S);i 2 I. To see this, rst notice that the latent utilities process can be represented











t; i = 1;:::;I
where Bt is an I-dimensional Brownian motion (with independent components) and ~ II = [~ ij].
Let @SH = f(x;t) 2 @S : zi
1(t)  xi  zi
2g. By Corollary II.2.11.2 in Gihman and Skorohod (1972)
(p. 308), one gets that P[(xS;S) 2 @SH] = u(x;t) is an A-harmonic function in C = Sc. In other
words,
Au(x) + ut(x;t) = 0 in C
u(x;t) = 1 if (x;t) 2 @SH




















is the innitesimal generator associated with the above diusion. By the Minimum Principle
for elliptic operators (see Proposition 4.1.3 in Port and Stone (1978)), if u attains a minimum
(which in this case would be zero) on C, it is constant on C. This would in turn imply that
8(x;t) 2 C;u(x) = P[(xS;S) 2 @SHjx0 = x] = 0. But by Proposition 2.3.6 in Port and Stone
(1978), one can deduce that u(x;t) = P[(xS;S) 2 @SHjx0 = x] 6= 0.
(Necessity) If there are no endogenous eects, one agent's drift is never aected by the exit
of other agents. Each agent's decision is given by 
i = infft 2 R+ : xi
t > zi = z(i;i;Ci;i)g.
There will be clustering only if 
i = 
j ;i 6= j. The state-variable vector can be represented as
above until the killing time S. Then, there will be clustering only if xt hits S at the point (zi)i2I.
But in I  2 dimensions any one-point set A is polar with respect to a Brownian motion, i.e.,
30P[A < 1] = 0 where A is the hitting time for A (Proposition 2.2.5 in Port and Stone (1978)).
So, P[
i = 
j ;i 6= j] = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5
If there are no endogenous eects, the equilibrium strategies are characterized by the thresholds
z(;;;C). The marginal distribution for these are then (possibly defective) Inverse Gaussian




































(see Whitmore (2006)). Notice that the expression does not depend on I and this completes the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2
We start out by proving the conditions for Lyapunov's Central Limit Theorem for an arbitrary
combination of yn;N;1 and yn;N;2.





































and observe that, provided (1;2;3) 6= (0;0;0), (0;0;0) = 0 , p(0) = 0 (since p(0) = 0 ,
v(0) = 0). Consider then
Ln;N =
P











31for some  > 0. That this is the case can be seen because
PN
n=1 EjLn;Nj2+ =
A z }| {
N
1 (1+=2)(1 )











We set  = " if p(0) = 0 (Assumption 1 holds) and  = 0, otherwise.
For C, observe that
C 
P











With respect to B, imposing  = 0 and assuming that p(0) > 0, one has
(N;1;N;2;N;3)
N  ! (0;0;0) > 0:
In case p(0) = 0, notice that (;;) is a function of p(). This being dierentiable, by the Mean

















where 0  b N;k  N;k;k = 1;2;3 and @(;;) is the gradient vector for (;;). We draw
























































































































i (0;0;0) > 0
32where ai;i = 1;2;3 are positive constants by Assumption 2. This suces to show that B converges
to a nite value.
If p(0) > 0, A = N =2  ! 0. When p(0) = 0, we can drive A to zero by choosing  > 0
so that
 > 2((1   ")











































































































































































































































as long as  > 1=3. If p(0) > 0, it is possible to see that the statistic diverges using similar
arguments. 
Proof of Theorem 3
Step 1: Consider the expected log-likelihood function conditioned on w:
KL( ; ^  ;w) =
Z
log[g(t; ^  ;w)]g(t; ;w)dt
From the properties of the Kullback-Leibler information criterion (or relative entropy) for two
probability distributions, it is obtained that ^   maximizes the expected log-likelihood if and only
if g(t; ^  ;w) = g(t; ;w) (see Schervish (1995), Proposition 2.92). In particular, ^   =   is one such
maximizer.
Step 2: Take 	 = f ; ^  g. Also, let wi = (wc
i;wd
i) where wc
i denotes the continuous random
covariates and wd
i, those with a discrete component. We now verify the conditions in Theorem 1
in Ara ujo and Mas-Colell (1978). For each xed value in the support of (wd
i)i2I:
1. 	 is trivially Lindel of since it is compact.31
31We could allow for 	 to be a subset of RK. R2K is Lindel of since it is separable and metrizable and thus,
second countable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 3.1). This implies that it is Lindel of (see Aliprantis
and Border (1999), p. 45).
342. The Kullback-Leibler information criterion is continuous on the parameters and w. To
obtain this result, notice that





G(t; ) = P( > t; ) = E[Ifsupst xi
s( ) z(t; )>0 for some ig] = E[((xs)
t
s=0)jx0 = x]
The derivative of this last expression with respect to the parameters is well dened and can
be obtained through Malliavin calculus (see Proposition 3.1 in Fourni e, Lasry, Lebuchoux,
Lions, and Touzi (1999) for the drift, for example). The assumption that () is a continuous
function on the covariates achieves the result.
3. The derivative exists and is continuous since we assume that () is of class C1 with respect
to the continuous random variables.
4. Pick any product measure  equivalent to the measure represented by the CDF Fwc. Since
the latter is assumed to be continuous, its measure is absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure and  is also absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure.
5. The Sondermann Condition in Ara ujo and Mas-Colell (1978) holds by assumption.
By Theorem 1 in Ara ujo and Mas-Colell (1978), there is at most one maximizer for the expected
log-likelihood function Fwc-a.e. for each element in the support of wd and we know that  
maximizes it. The statement is easily extended Fw-a.e. since the support of wd is countable and
the union of countable events with null measure | there being more than one maximizer | has
zero measure. 
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38Figure 1: Sequential Stopping
Figure 2: Simultaneous Stopping
39Table 1: Individual Regressions
Dependent variable: log(Days Until Desertion)
Coef. Std. Error t P> jtj Coef. Std. Error t P> jtj
Company Size 0.002 0.0006 3.43 0 0.0019 0.0006 3.08 0.00
Bounty Paid 0.0015 0.0006 2.36 0.02
Foreigner -0.2144 0.0504 -4.25 0.00
Substitute 0.1874 0.0996 1.88 0.06
Age -0.0095 0.0033 -2.86 0.00
Height 0.0256 0.0095 2.7 0.01
State Controls: Yes Yes
Year Controls: Yes Yes
Number of obs = 3337 3237
R-squared = 0.2983 0.3076
y Standard errors are robust standard errors.















2=1 3=1 y1 y2 y3 Test Statistic
2 3 0.002289 0.002693 0.002859 -6.25
2 5 0.002289 0.002693 0.003358 -11.31
2 10 0.002289 0.002693 0.004210 -13.18
3 4 0.002289 0.002859 0.003216 -13.05
3 5 0.002289 0.002859 0.003358 -16.99
3 10 0.002289 0.002859 0.004210 -20.95
y 1 = 1 day. All 303 companies were used.
Table 3: Model Estimation
^  ^  ^  ^ 
0.0438 0.0050 5.8610 0.1008
(0.0113) (0.0000) (0.0219) (0.0040)
(per year) (per year) (per year)
y Initial position = 0:1. Exit cost = 1. Discount
rate = 5% per year.
40